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THE ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1972-1991. 
Introduction 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
and 
DAVID WINTERFORD* 
For most of the 1980s, the Pakistan economy performed well, 
with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing by over 6 per cent per 
annum. However, the latter part of the decade was characterized by 
increasing fiscal and external deficits, infrastructure deficiencies and 
disruptions in production. In 1989 the Government initiated a three-year 
structural adjustment program with the assistance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The program sought to redress the growing macro-
imbalances. resulting from large fiscal deficits, and to increase 
productivity through major structural reforms in the real as well as the 
financial sectors.1 
By the late 1980s fiscal imbalances resulted in the public sector's 
gross fixed investment declinJng in real terms in both 1988 and 1990. In 
fact a relative decline in the growth in public sector investment occurred 
throughout the 1980s, so that by the end of the 1980s the growth in 
capital formation was the lowest in the country's history. 2 The limited 
expansion of public sector investment is particularly disturbing in lieu of 
sbasethe fact that the country's stock of infrastructure is modest even by 
third world standards. Clearly, if a stable relationship exists between 
increases in social overhead capital and private sector capital formation 
• 
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then the likely declines in public investment stemming from current 
austerity programs may have severe consequences for the nation's 
development process. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of 
declining public sector investment in Pakistan. Specifically, we are 
interested in examining the impact on the economy of these trends in 
infrastructural investment. Has investment in this area acted primarily to 
increase output or has it stimulated private sector investment? 
Alternatively, has public infrastructure been passive, largely responding to 
obvious needs created by growth of private sector capital formation? 
Patterns of Investment and Infrastructural Development 
The Pakistan Government does not publish data on the stock of 
and increments to the country's infrastructure. However, Blejer and Khan 
suggest two approaches to approximate increments to the nation's 
infrastructural base. 3 The basic assumption underlying these proxies is 
that infrastructure investment is an ongoing process that moves slowly 
over time and cannot be changed very rapidly. 
The first approach takes the trend level of real public sector 
investment as representing the long-term or infrastructural component. In 
the discussion that follows this measure is referred to as "estimated 
infrastructure." In computing this measure of infrastructure we have used 
a linear trend (see note to Table 1 ). Deviations of real public sector 
inve$tment from the trend are assumed to correspond to non-
infrastructural investment.· 
A second approach is to make the distinction between types of 
public investment on the basis of whether the investment is expected or 
not. Again, it is assumed that expected, or anticipated, public investment 
is' closer to the long-term or infrastructural component. If deterioration is 
occurring in the country's stock of infrastructure, this measure may be a 
more accurate proxy than that obtained using the trend method. 
The data reveal several trends ir1 the pattern of public sector 
investment (See Table 1 ). First, there has been a gradual deceleration in 
the rate of increase in the government's gross capital formation. For the 
period as a whole, real public capital formation increased at a rate of 8.3 
per cent per annum. However. the data reveal two distinct periods: during 
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the 1970s. the real rate of public capita formation was 14.5 per cent, 
sharply declining to 3. 7 per cent per annum during the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that public sector investment increased 
to a rate of 5.6 per cent during the 1985-90 period. 
Second, in terms of the composition of public sector capital 
formation. investment in the energy sector had the fastest rate of 
expansion. averaging 13.3 per cent over the 1973-90 period, accelerating 
to 18.3 per cent in the 1980s. 
~. Third, public enterprises experienced the lowest overall rate of 
capital formation, averaging 6.4 per cent per annum for the entire period. 
These enterprises include the railway and the post office, telegraph and 
telephone departments. 
Fourth, non-energy semi-public organizations showed the 
sharpest decline in investment in the 1980s, averaging 6.2 per cent rate of 
growth in the 1980s (compared to 16.9 per cent in the 1970s). More 
importantly, capital formation in this area contracted at an annual rate of 
4.8 per cent during the 1985-90 period. 
General government capital formation in Pakistan consists of 
investment undertaken by the federal, provincial and local governments. 
These agencies account for around 30-40 per cent of total public 
investment. averaging 36.6 per cent during the 1980s.4 A pattern similar to 
total public sector investment exists in that general government 
investment averaged slightly less than that experienced by the public 
sector as a whole, averaging 13.1 per cent (versus 14.5 per cent for total 
government) for the entire period under consideration. This decelerated to 
7.8 per cent in the 1980s (versus 3. 7 per cent for total government). As the 
data indicate, provincial government investment expanded the most 
rapidly over the 1972-90 period, followed by federal and local government 
capital formation; In the 1980s however there was a shift to local 
investment with rates of investment averaging 9.6 per cent per annum for 
local government (and 14.4 per cent for the 1985-90 period) compared to 
8.5 per cent for provincial governments (and provincial government 
capital formation at 5.6 per cent for the 1985-90 period). 
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TABLE 1 
PAKISTAN: GROWTH RATES OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE, 1973-1990 
Percentage Growth Rates by Period 
Sector 1973-90 1973-80 1980-90 1985-90 
Energy 13.3 9.1 18.3 18.2 
Public Enterprise 6.4 7.1 6.0 1.2 
Semi-Public Organizationsa 3.3 16.9 6.2 -4.8 
Total Government 8.3 14.5 3.7 5.6 
Level of Government 
Total General Government 10.1 13.1 7.8 6.9 
Federal Government 9.5 14.0 6.1 5.1 
Provincial Government 11.6 15.6 8.5 5.6 
Local Government 7.6 5.2 9.6 14.4 
Estimated Public lnvestmentl1 
Energy 7.5 10.4 5.5 
Public Enterprise 6.5. 8.5 5.2 
Semi-Public Organizationsa 2.7 3.0 2.5 
Total Government 6.3 8.4 4.8 
Estimated Public Investment by 
Level of Governmentl1 
Total General Government 7.5 10.4 5.5 
Federal Government 6.5 8.e 5.0 
Provincial Government 8.3 12.0 5.8 
Local Government 9.4 14.0 6.3 
Expected Public lnvestmen~ 
Energy 13.6 14.1 13.2 22.5 
Public Enterprise 4.6 4.5 4.7 0.7 
Semi-Public Organizationsa 2.9 9.3 -1.3 -0.9 
Total Government 7.3 11.7 4.3 6.8 
Expected Public Investment 
by Level of Governmen~ 
Total General Government 8.7 12.7 5.9 6.6 
Federal Government 7.0 10.7 4.5 7.0 
Provincial Government 9.4 14.7 5.9 5.0 
Local Government 7.6 1.1 . 12.4 10.1 
Source: Compiled from data in World Bank, Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and 
Prospects--Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 1991); and World Bank, Pakistan: Progress 
Under the Si11th Plan (1984). • 
Notes: a = non energy public organizations; b = Infrastructure estimated from equation 
Yt = a + TIMEt where Yt is public sector investment in year t and TIME! is a time trend. 
Infrastructure is the predicted value of Ytc = Expected infrastructure estimated from 
equation Yt = a + Yt-1 where Yt is public investment in year t and Yt-1 is the same 
investment lagged one year. Infrastructure is the estimated value of Yt. 
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As a result of these patterns. the share of the federal government 
in general government capital formation has fallen from around 38-40 per 
cent in the early 1980s to 32-34 per cent by the late 1980s. Provincial 
governments have maintained a fairly constant share at around 48-50 per 
cent, while local governments have seen their share of general 
government capital formation increase from 12-15 per cent in the late 
1970s-early 1980s to nearly 20 per cent by 1990.5 
As one would ·expect. these patterns have been mirrored in the 
case of estimated and expected public sector investment in infrastructure. 
(See Table 1). 
The Role of Infrastructure in Development 
The patterns of infrastructure investment noted above are 
important largely because of their implications for medium and longer 
term economic growth, both at the national and regional levels. The 
potential of infrastructure to affect movements in income has long 
intrigued economists. This possibility is clearly suggested by 
infrastructure's key role in Hirschman's unbalanced development strategy 
and in the theory of inter regional comparative advantage. 6 If a stable 
relationship between infrastructure and growth exists, Pakistan's public 
sector would have a powerful tool to stimulate national. economic 
development. 
Unfortunately there is no consensus on this issue. Instead, there 
is a broad spectrum of viewpoints concerning the role of infrastructure in 
the development process. There is a consensus. however, on the need for 
basic infrastructural facilities in potential_ development areas. Transport, 
for example. can be a limiting factor without which no development 
process could take off even if other development inducing factors were in 
play. Beyond this point. opinions on infrastructure's role in socioeconomic 
development processes differ widely. 
In the case of transport, sor;ne transport economists take the view· 
that the role of transport is simply to "relieve tensions" generated by 
supply and demand patterns as well as potentials scattered throughout 
the region. 7 In their view. transport has merely a derived function. In 
support of the argument that transport investment merely spreads growth 
rather than inducing growth. these experts claim that regional growth 
following alterations in the transport system is simply the result of 
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processes having been geographically displaced which would have 
occurred in any case in another place. Transport is thus unable to induce 
independent development processes. and socioeconomic disparities in 
the region are the cause and not the result of the region's inadequate 
transport system. In the opinion of these experts, the stimulus that 
railways (as the first efficient mode of transport) gave to industrial growth 
is grossly overestimated. According to them, the take-off in the oldest 
industrial countries occurred before the advent of the railway and is 
attributable to numerous and far more complex determining factors. 
One small group of transport economists, led by Fritz Voigt, 
maintain that alterations in the transport system exert a follow-on 
influence on macroeconomic and social processes.a Their main 
contention is that autonol]lous or induced changes in the transport 
system produce external effects on the area serviced. Because of the 
space-bridging function of transport, these external effects have such a 
strong impact that a differentiation of development opportunities sets in, 
varying in extent according to the scale of the transport measures taken. 
Under certain conditions the impulses generated by efficient transport 
facilities not only induce socioeconomic development processes but also 
constitute a decisive independent variable of regional disparities in 
prosperity levels. Thus. according to this perspective, the tempo of 
development processes in a market economy is determined by the 
technological level of transport. 
Hirschman's unbalanced growth strategy is a variant cit this 
position.9 In Hirschman's view, a rapid expa.nsion in infrastructure 
unbalances an economy. In doing so, infrastructure not only creates a 
wide spectrum of newly profitable areas of investment for the private 
sector. Perhaps even more importantly, areas become more easily 
identified by inexperienced investors. In short, over significant intervals of 
time, developing countries pursuing Hirschman's unbalanced growth 
strategy should experience sustained and perhaps even abnormally high 
rates of private sector investment. This outcome stems directly from the 
incentives and pressures associated with .the relative expansion of the 
stock of social overhead capital. 
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The majority of transport economists take a middle position 
between these two more or less diametrically opposed views. Some 
consider the transport system to be a function of the level of 
socioeconomic development. In other words, the more economically and 
socially backward a potential development region, the stronger will be the 
impulses emanating from improvements in the transport system. Others 
feel that the reciprocal relationship between changes in the transport 
system and socioeconomic development is such that the problem of 
"' cause and effect is not open to solution. This applies also to the large 
. ...._. number of interdependencies that remain to be tested empirically. 
The fundamental importance of the relationship between changes 
in the stock of infrastructure and the pattern of socio-economic 
development has led to considerable r~search activity. However, most of 
this research has focused on the role of transportation in alleviating 
regional disparities in the more developed countries.10 In addition, and 
almost without exception, the case studies published to date have been 
undertaken without any general theory as a basis, and have produced no 
tenable theories of their own. 11 Commenting on the state of 
transportation economics, Alder has noted that "it is frequently assumed 
that all transport improvements stimulated economic development. The. 
sad truth is that some do, some do not and that there may be better 
investment opportunities. u12 
Clearly, much of this debate centers on the issue of causation: 
does infrastructure cause growth or does investment of this type simply 
respond to the needs created by such growth? Empirical studies have 
largely simply assumed. rather than verifying, the direction of causation. 
For example, Glover and Simon argue that higher population density in 
developing countries has made a significant contribution to road 
building.13 Simon contends that a positive effect stems from the impact of 
population density on agricultural savings in irrigation systems.14 Both 
studies included per capita income as well as population density as an 
independent variable. In the Glover and Simon study, per capita income 
was found to have a significant and positive effect on road building, but in 
Simon's paper its effect on irrigation systems was negligible. In a later 
study, Frederiksen confirmed the cross sectional analysis of Glover and 
Simon with a case study of the Philippines. 15 However, it should be noted 
that these studies simply assumed the linkage was from population to 
infrastructure and thus they placed infrastructure on the right hand side of 
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the equation. Similar statistical results would of course be found if 
infrastructure had been assumed to be the independent variable. 
Clearly, for policy purposes one neeqs to know the direction and 
magnitude of causation between infrastructure and the economy. If 
infrastructure leads and stimulates the economy then it is a valuable 
policy variable for such programs a$ attacking regional income 
disparities. In this circumstance. however, capital facilities are likely to be 
underutilized and their benefits spread out over a considerable time 
period. On the other hand, if infrastructure is more passive, simply 
responding to the pressures placed on existing facilities, then it acts more 
as a bottleneck. Under these circumstances the productivity of expanded 
infrastructur.e facilities may be quite high and its contribution to the 
economy realized rather quickly 
Linkages between infrastructure and the economy are difficult if 
not impossible to sort out through simply examining the historical record. 
In the case of Pakistan, several patterns seem to stand. out. First, for the 
period as a whole. public investment has gradually expanded its share of 
total capital formation from 38.8 per cent in 1972 to 48. 7 per cent in 1990. 
Correspondingly the share of private investment declined from 61.2 per 
cent to 51 .3 per cent.16 As a result, the 1970s were generally a period of 
increasing infrastructure per unit of private investment, with the 1980s a 
period of decreased support for private investment--increasing rations of 
private investment to infrastructure. The one exception is in the energy 
sector where rapid rates of. public sector investment have resulted in a 
dramatic fall in the amount of private sector investment per increase in 
energy infrastructure.17 
As Table 2 indicates, while the overall ratio qt investment to GDP 
has increased gradually over time (1.2 per cent per annum over the period 
1973-1990), the public sector investment to output ratio has been fairly 
volatile--increasing at a rate of 9. 7 per cent during the 1970s and 
decreasing by 3 per cent per annum during the 1990s. As a result, the 
1980s have seen a fairly dramatic fall in the ratio of public sector 
infrastructure to national income--output ~s being supported by less qnd 
less infrastructure 
...,.,. 
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TABLE 2 
PAKISTAN: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 1973-1990 
A. Public Infrastructure Support For Private Investment 1973-1990 
77 
Average Annual Percentage Rates of Growth 
1973-90 1973-80 1980-90 1985-90 
Share of Total 
Capltal Formation 
Public Sector 1.3 5.5 -2.0 
-2.0 
Private Sector -1.0 -5.0 2.4 2.2 
Private Sector Share 
Total Public Infrastructure -0.6 -5.3 3.3 5.8 
Total Expected Infrastructure -0.3 -5.3 3.8 3.3 
Expe(,1ed General Infrastructure -1.5 -6.1 2.3 3.6 
Expected Energy Infrastructure -5.5 -6.8 -4.4 -9.8 
8. Infrastructure and National Output 1973-1990 
Average Annual Percentage Rates of Growth and (Average Share) 
1973-90 
Investment 
Total Investment 1.2 4.6 
(17.2) 
Public lm1estment 2.0 
(9.6) 






































Source: Compiled from data in World Bank, Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and 
Prospects-Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 1991). 
Notes: Expected infrastructure estimated from equation INFt = a + INFt-1 where INFt is 
the investment in infrastructure in year t and INFt-1 is the investment in infrastructure in the 
previous year. 
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The patterns of infrastructure expansion, private sector 
investment and increased output of GDP are obviously complex. While 
the above patterns are consistent with a causal relationship whereby 
private sector investment is stimulated by infrastructure which in turn 
responds to increased output. they are by no means definitive. To sort out 
the causation issues, the following section examines Pakistan's 
macroeconomic linkages in a more formal manner. 
The Impact of Infrastructure: The Issue of Causation 
As noted, a major issue in the analysis of the role of infrastructure 
in Pakistan's post 1971 development centers on the direction of 
causation: does infrastructure affect various aspects of the national 
economy as suggested by Voigt or does it simply respond to the needs 
created by economic growth and investment? 
Clearly, prior to drawing definitive conclusions concerning the 
impact of the government's large investment in infrastructure, one must 
satisfactorily address the issue of causation. Fortunately. several statistical 
tests using regression analysis for this purpose are gaining wider 
acceptance. 
Granqer Test 
The original and most widely used causality test was developed 
by Granger. 18 According to this test. infrastructure causes (say) growth in 
GDP if growth can be predicted more accurately by past values of 
infrastructure investment than by past values of growth. To be certain that 
causality runs from infrastructure to growth, past values of energy must 
also be more accurate than past values of growth at predicting 
infrastructure expenditures. 
More formally, Granger defines causality such that X Granger 
causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of 
mean square error, with the use of past values of X than without using 
past X. 19 Based upon the definition at Granger causality, a simple 
bivariate autoregressive (AR) model for infrastructure (INF) and GDP can 
Infrastructure Role in Pakistan's Economic Development 79 
be specified as follows: 
p q 
(1) GDP(t) = c + SUM a(i)GDP(t-i) + SUM bG)INF(t-j) + u(t) 
i=1 j= 1 
r s 
(2) INF(t) = c + SUM d(i)INF(t-1) +SUM eO)GDP(t-j)+v(t) 
i= 1 j = 1 
. ...., where GDP is the gross domestic product and INF = infrastructure 
~" expenditures; p, q, r and s are lag lengths for each variable in the 
equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white noise residuals. By 
assuming that error terms (u, v) are "nice," ordinary least squares (OLS) 
becomes the appropriate estimation method.20 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint 
F-test is appropriate for causal detection. Where: 
(RSS(x) - RSS(u) /(df(x) - df(u) 
3) F = --------------------------------------R SS ( u) / df ( u)and RSS(r) 
and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and unrestricted 
models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the degrees of 
freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following 
manner: first, unidirectional causality from INF to GDP if the F-test rejects 
the null hypothesis that past values of DEF in equation (1) are 
insignificantly different from zero and if the F-Test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that past values of GDP in equation (2) are insignificantly 
different from zero. That is, DEF causes GDP but GDP does not cause 
INF. Unidirectional causality runs from GDP to DEF if the reverse is true. 
Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF and GDP if both f.-test 
statistics reiect the null hypotheses in equations (1) and (2). Finally, no 
causality exists between INF and GDP if we can not reject both null 
hypotheses at the conventional significance level. 
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The results of . Granger causality tests depend critically on the 
choice of lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag 
length, the omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is 
greater than the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes 
estimates to be inefficient. While it is possible to choose lag lengths based 
on preliminary partial autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason 
to assume lag lengths equal for all types of infrastructure. 
The Hsiao Procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsiao developed a 
systematic method for assigning lags.21 This method combines Granger 
Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean 
square prediction error. to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In 
a paper examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, 
Thornton and Batten found Hsiao's method to be superior to arbitrary lag 
length selection and to several other systematic procedures for 
determining lag length.22 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of 
autoregressiye regressions on the dependent variable. In the first 
regression, the dependent variable has a lag of one. This increases by one 
in each succeeding regression. Here. we estimate M regressions of the 
form: 
m 
(4) G(t) = a + Sum b(t-1 )G(t-1) + e(i) 
i= 1 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we 
compute the FPE in the following manner: 
(5) T + m + 1 FPE(m) = ------------T - m -1 ESS(m)/T 
where T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final 
prediction error and the sum of squared errors. respectively. The optimal 
* lag length, m , is the lag length that prqduces the lowest FPE. Having 
determined m* additional regressions expand the equation with the lags 
on the other variable added sequentially in the same manner used to 
! 
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determine m*. Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
* m n 
(6) G(t) =a +Sum b(t-1)G(t-1) +Sum c(t-1)D(t-1) + e(i) 
i= 1 i= 1 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for 
each regression as: 
* FPE(m ,n) 
* T+m +n+1 * 
--------*-------- ESS(m ,n) /T 
T-m -n-1 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length that produces 
the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is 
equivalent to using a series of F tests with variable levels of significance.23 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term 
measures the modeling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality 
property that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected 
and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is 
selected."24 As noted by Judge et. al., an intuitive reason for using the 
FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the 
ASS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces optimally 
balanced when their product reaches its minimum.25 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases 
are possible: (a) Infrastructure causes Growth when the prediction error 
for growth decreases when infrastructure investment is included in the 
growth equation. In addition. when growth is added to the infrastructure 
equation. the final prediction error should increase: (b) Growth causes 
Infrastructure when the prediction error for growth increases when 
infrastructure is addeds to the regression equation for growth, and .is 
reduced when growth is added to the regression equation for 
infrastructure; (c) Feedback occurs when the final prediction error 
decreases when defense is added to the growth equation, and the final 
prediction error decreases when growth is added to the defense 
infrastructure: and (d) No Relations/rlip exists when the final prediction 
error increase~ both when defense is added to the growth equation and 
when growth is added to the infrastructure equation. 
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Operational Procedures 
The data for investment and infrastructure expenditures used to 
carry out the causation tests were derived from World Bank, Pakistan: 
Current Economic Situation and Prospects--Report No. 10223-PAK 
(March 16, 1992); World Bank, Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and 
Prospects--Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 1991); and World Bank, 
Pakistan: Progress Under the Sixth Plan (1984). Both the Gross Domestic 
Product and the GDP price deflater are from various issues of the 
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflater and are in constant 1985 
prices. For best statistical results, the variables were transformed into their 
logarithmic values. 26 
To determine if the results were sensitive to the definition of 
infrastructure used, an additional measure of infrastructure, the smoothed 
exponential trend of the relevant form of public expenditure, was also 
introduced into the analysis. This second measure may be more .stable 
than the expected (or anticipated) measure noted above. Because of this, 
the smoothed exponential trend is referred to as the actual increase in 
infrastructure in the results that follow. 
As the analysis above indicates, the ratio of public to private 
investment has changed dramatically over time--relatively high in the 
1970s and low in the 1980s. In part, this pattern stemmed from the relative 
stagnation of private investment in the 1970s due to political turmoil and 
uncertainty concerning nationalization. This pattern may bias our results 
to the extent that increased infrastructure in the 1970s may appear 
ineffective in stimulating private investment when in reality other factors 
offset its stimulus. To control for this potential bias, our measures of 
infrastructure were weighted by the ratio of public to private investment 
(referred to below as "weighted infrastructure"). 
Relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the 
economy were considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 
ninety-five per cent level of confidence. That is, if ninety-five per cent of 
• 
the time we could conclude that they had not occurred by pure chance, -... 
we considered them statistically significant. . ,,. 
There is no theoretical reason to believe that infrastructure and 
the economy have a set lag relationship--that is, that they have an impact 
on one another over a fixed time period. The period could be a rather 
-... 
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short run involving largely the spin-off from construction or longer term as 
either term expands from the stimulus provided by the other. To find the 
optimal adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to six years were 
estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical significance 
was the one chosen to best depict the relationship under consideration 
(the optimal lag reported in Tables 3 through 5). 
Results 
The results for Gross Domestic Product (see Table 3 and 4) and 
private investment (see Table 5) indicate the direction of causation. 
together with the optimal lag time for each macro aggregate. As a basis of 
comparison, the results using public investment are also presented. 
Strength assessments reflect the magnitude of the impact and the 
statistical significance of the relationship. 
" . ·.: ~,;;· 
i; 
. . ~· -' 
I 
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TABLE 3 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
A B c D 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 3 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.19E-3) (0.93E-2) (0.54E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 3.38 2.91 1.57 1.83 Growth-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 1315 5.22 13.86 Invest 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.998 Q.936 0.966 (+w) 
General Public Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.18E-3) (0.69E-2) (0.38E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 3.04 1.69 1.86 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 15.37 4.99 20.83 (+w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.998 0.932 0.966 
General Weighted Public Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) 10.20E-3) (0.12E-1} (0.11E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 3.01 1.82 1.70 Growth·> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 18.14 5.53 11.19 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.998 0.786 0.810 (+w} 
General Weighted Public Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 4 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.19*E-3) (0.20E-3) (0.60E-2) (0.39E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 3.08 2.11 1.90 Growth·> 
Ung-Box Q Statistic 11.01 19.74 4.18 18.14 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 0998 0.998 0368 0660 (+m) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsiao Procedure was 
incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in logarithmic form. 
Anticipated infrastructure is the value predicted by regressing public investment on its 
value in the previous year. Actual infrastructure approximated as the smoothed 
exponential trend of public investment. Regression Patterns: A = growth on growth; B = 
investment (infrastructure) on growth; C = investment (infrastructure) on investment 
(infrastructure); and D = growth on investment (infrastructure). The Dominant pattern is 
that with the lowest final prediction error. Weighted = multiplied by the ratio of public to 
private infrastructure. The signs ( + ,-) represent' the direction of impact. In the case of 
feedback the two signs represent the lowest final predicti9n error of relationships Band D. 
Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s 
=strong; m = moderate; w = weak) based on the size of the standardized regression 
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TABLE 4 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF PUBLIC ENERGY INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
A B c D 
Public Energy Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 4 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.19E-3) (O.BOE-1) (0.62E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 3.38 3.01 2.37 2.67 Growth-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 13.26 1.66 4.67 Invest 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.998 0.773 0.835 (+w) 
Public Energy Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 4 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.21E-3) (0.63E-1) (0.55E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 2.40 2.55 2.76 Growth-> 
85 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 8.94 2.45 4.58 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.998 0.752 0795 (+w) 
Public Energy Weighted Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.21 E-3) (0.81E-1) (0.71E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 2.47 184 2.38 Growth-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 1101 8.00 6.86 4.61 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 · 0.998 0.998 0.666 0.731 (+w) 
Public Energy Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 4 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.19E-3) (0.16E-3) (0.58E-2) (0.34E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 3.35 2.61 2.89 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 18.78 7.19 19.08 (+w,+m) 
Adjusted r2 0998 0.999 0963 0.979 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsiao Procedure was 
incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in logarithmic form. 
Anticipated infrastructure is the value predicted by regressing public investment on its 
value in the previous year. Actual infrastructure approximated as the smoothed 
exponential trend of public investment. Regression Patterns: A = growth on growth; B = 
investment (inirastructure) on growth: C = investment (infrastructure) on investment 
(infrastructure); and D = growth on investment (infrastructure). The Dominant pattern is 
that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs ( + ,-) represent the direction of impact. 
In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of 
relationships i3 and D. Weighted = •multiplied by the ratio of public to private 
infrastructure. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2. 3, and 4 year lags Strength 
assessment (s =strong: m = moderate; w = weak) based on the size of the standardized 
regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
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Several important patterns characterize general government 
investment and infrastructure. (See Table 3). First, general public 
investment and infrastructure (composed of federal, provincial and local 
jurisdictions) tended to be determined by the overall expansion of the 
economy, rather than providing an initial stimulus to growth. The one 
exception is anticipated infrastructure where growth stimulated the 
provision of additional infrastructure and that infrastructure in turn 
contributed to further economic expansion. It should be noted, however, 
that both impacts were rather weak. Second, the pattern of public to 
private investment did not affect the overall conclusion that general public 
investment tends to be responsive to rather than initiating growth. Finally, 
the best results (in terms of the final prediction error) were obtained for 
our measure of actual infrastructure. This pattern continued throughout 
the analysis. 
Similar patterns were obtained tor the relationship between the 
expansion of the public sector in energy and overall economic growth. 
(See Table 4). Again, the overall picture is one whereby economic growth 
places pressure on the public sector to provide expanded amounts of 
energy. Only in the case of actual infrastructure was there any hint that 
expanded public sector infrastructure in energy stimulated the economy. 
Even here, the impact of overall growth on energy was much stronger 
than that from energy to growth. 
To assess the effect of infrastructure on private investment, 
general public investment was examined in terms of its components. 
Logically, each source of public funds (federal. provincial and local) might 
be biased towards the provision of one type of infrastructure--federal 
towards communications. provincial towards transportation. and local 
authorities concerned more with filling the remaining gaps. 
Again, the data reveal several patterns. (See Table 5). First, while 
federal investment provided a weak stimulus to private investment (and in 
turn was affected by private investment) the dominant pattern is for 
federal infrastructure either to impact negatively on private investment or 
to respond to the needs created by expanded private sector investment. 
Second. as with federal investment, provincial investment has provided a 
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TABLE 5 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
A B c D 
Federal Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 3 1 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.16E-2) (0.17E-1) (0.12E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.33 2.47 1.67 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 9.75 10.76 7.52 (+w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.990 o.9g2 0.864 0.843 
Federal Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 4 1 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.11E-2) (0.11E-1) (0.60E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.08 2.51 2.10 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 6.47 10.86 13.29 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0990 0.994 0.838 0.875 
Federal Weighted Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 4 1 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.18E-2) (0.16E-1) (0.12E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 1.83 2.09 1.40 Investment-> 
Ling-Bo" 0 Statistic 9.86 4.72 6.30 9.88 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.990 0.658 0.272 (+w) 
Federal Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 2 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.20E-2) (0.86E-2) (0.43E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 2.40 2.11 1.66 Investment-> 
Ung-Box Q Statistic 11.01 8.52 3.21 5.28 Infrastructure 
Adjusted r2 0.998 0.99 0.916 0.731 (+w) 
Provincial Government Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 2 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.17E-2) (0.13E-1) (0.99E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.30 1.31 2.70 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 7.26 6.06 4.81 (-w.+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.990 0.902 0.928 
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
A B c D 
' 
Provincial Government Infrastructure (anticipated) ~'~~r 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 4 2 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.14E-2) (0.98E-2) (0.SOE-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.15 2.22 2.82 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 9.46 5.26 7.21 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0990 0.992 0.892 0.919 
Provincial Government Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 2 4 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.16E-2) (0.73E-3) (0.40E-3) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.79 2.19 2.50 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 7.72 4 57 6.05 (-w.+w) 
Adjusted r2 0990 0.987 0.989 0.994 
Provincial Government Weighted Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 2 4 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.15E-2) (067E-2) (0.48E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 2.41 2.01 1.53 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 11.01 9.07 3.75 8.87 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.992 0.381 0.584 
Local Government Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 4 1 Final 
Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.16E-2) (030E-1) (0.25E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.79 1.97 2.09 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 9.86 11.23 9.71 9.61 (-w.+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.991 0.870 0.898 
Local Government Infrastructure (anticipated) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 2 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.18E-2) (0.32E-1) (0.22E-1) 
urbin-Watson Statistic 2.49 2.63 1.75 1.47 Private-> ~'-
ing-Box Q Statistic 9.86 11.19 13.32 21.48 Infrastructure .... ;"'~'-
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.990 0.852 0.901 (+m) "-~~--="· . 
.!. 
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
A B c D 
Public Energy Weighted Infrastructure (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 2 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.17E-2) (0.14E-2) (0.14E-1) (0.11E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.38 2.59 1.96 2.76 Feedback 
Ling-Box 0 Statistic 11.01 9.69 8.85 15.12 (+w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.990 0.992 0.941 0.952 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsiao Procedure was 
incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in logarithmic form. 
Anticipated infrastructure is the value predicted by regressing public investment on its 
value in the previous year. Actual infrastructure approximated as the smoothed 
exponential trend of public investment. Regression Patterns: A = private investment on 
private investment; B = public investment (infrastructure) on private investment; C = 
investment (infrastructure) on investment (infrastructure); and D = private investment on 
public investment (infrastructure). The Dominant pattern is that with the lowest final 
prediction error. The signs ( + ,-) represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback 
the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of relationships B and D. Weighted 
= multiplied by the ratio of public to private infrastructure. Each of the variables was 
regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s =strong: m = moderate; w 
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stimulus to private investment (and in turn responded positively to 
increased private investment). In contrast, provincial government 
infrastructure is more interdependent than private investment. Again, 
however, the impact of provincial infrastructure on private investment has 
been largely negative. Third, local government investment has had a weak 
negative impact on private investment. On the other hand, local 
infrastructure has followed a pattern similar to that of provincial 
infrastructure: negative interdependency with private investment. Finally, 
the bright spot in the public sector's program appears to be in the area of 
energy. Here, all forms of energy investment and infrastructure (with the 
exception of weighted infrastructure) provided a mild stimulus to private 
investment. 
Although beyond the scope of this article to investigate, a 
possible explanation for the apparent negative relationship between 
public infrastructure and private investment may lie in the manner in which 
the public sector finances these projects. A recent study Burney and 
Yasmeen suggests that when infrastructure projects are financed through 
borrowing from the banking system, higher nominal interest rates may 
ensue. 27 They argue that "These in turn may end up crowding out private 
investment and consumption expenditures. Thus the government's efforts 
to boost investment in the economy by increasing the share of the public 
sector. particularly by borrowing, is likely to fall short of its objectives. This 
may also lead to a slowing down of the economy."28 
Conclusions 
The main finding of the analysis presented above is that 
infrastructure in Pakistan has acted rather passively in the sense that it 
has responded to the needs of the overall economy and the private 
sector, rather than strongly initiating growth in either of them. This does 
not mean that infrastructure has not contributed to the expansion of these 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed the productivity of infrastructure has 
been very high as evidenced by the country's extremely low incremental 
capital output ratio. The country has not built infrastructure only to have it 
stand while the economy grows into it. On the other hand. the relative 
;,. shortage of infrastructure means the et:onomy has little room to maneuver 
# through better utilization of existing facilities. 
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Of particular importance to the present study is the fact that the 
investment rate in Pakistan is unusually low relative to historical GDP 
growth rates. Over the last decade the incremental capital output ratio 
(ICOR) was 2. 7. This low ratio probably resulted from the factors noted 
above, and from the fact that over the past decade Pakistan has been 
depleting its existing capital stock by neglecting maintenance and 
replacement investment. It has also been making only low levels of 
investments in social sectors. Thus it is likely that the ICORs will be higher 
in the future because of heavy infrastructure investment requirements, 
especially for energy, highways, and basic amenities in urban and rural 
areas. Therefore, maintaining the historical GDP growth rate of 6 per cent 
per annum will require a substantial increase in the rate of investment.29 
Clearly a number of factors will affect Pakistan's growth over the 
next several years, and lack of infrastructure is only one of them. In the 
case of manufacturing a pattern is already becoming apparent. In 1990 
growth in large scale manufacturing was only about half the average rate 
for the period 1978-1988. The factors responsible for the recent poor 
performance are both internal and external. In addition to infrastructure 
bottlenecks. internal factors include political uncertainty and production 
disruptions arising from the deterioration in public order. External factors 
having an adverse impact on growth in manufacturing arise from the 
inefficient, inward oriented and highly protected nature of industry. 
Overall, the findings presented iri this paper suggest that the 
infrastructure bottleneck may become pervasive across a number of key 
sectors and, perhaps in the next several years. overshadow other factors 
currently restraining output. 
• 
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